Recent developments in Sweden have raised significant alarms as the government increases its focus on national security by expelling suspected spies. This shift comes in the wake of the decision to deport the Chinese journalist Xuefei Chen Axelsson, whose activities in Sweden have sparked discussions about espionage and intelligence operations in the country.
In the past five years, Sweden has issued twelve deportation orders against individuals deemed security threats, transitioning from a primary focus on terrorism to addressing espionage-related concerns. In April this year, Xuefei Chen Axelsson faced expulsion due to her potential risk to national security, with the decision made under the specific law concerning the control of certain foreigners (LSU). This law allows deportation if the Security Police (Säpo) assess that the individual may commit crimes under terrorism laws or pose a serious threat.
From 1 case to 15
A review by Uppdrag Granskning and Göteborgs-Posten reveals a notable trend in these cases. Prior to 2019, only one recorded instance of deportation was unrelated to terrorism—a case from 1995 involving a suspected Russian spy. However, since October 2019, the Swedish government has acted on 15 cases, with twelve linked specifically to espionage, raising concerns about foreign intelligence activities targeting Sweden.
Tony Ingesson, a lecturer in intelligence analysis at Lund University, suggests that this trend may reflect a changing security landscape reminiscent of Cold War dynamics. He notes a surge in intelligence operations directed at Sweden, complicating the national security environment. Ingesson explains that Säpo’s primary objective is to protect the country, which sometimes leads to prioritizing expulsion over criminal prosecution.
Questionable activities
The case of Xuefei Chen Axelsson has drawn particular scrutiny. Despite her public persona as a journalist who enjoys cooking and gardening, investigations reveal that she had been involved in activities that raise questions about her true intentions in Sweden. Chen Axelsson has attended numerous events critical of China, filming and interviewing participants without publishing any reports. Fredrik Hallström, operational chief at Säpo, expresses concern that the Chinese regime employs individuals posing as journalists to gather intelligence.
Chen Axelsson has denied these allegations, stating, “I was not there to monitor anyone. I attended to hear different opinions and to see if something was worth reporting.” However, emails indicate that she sought to involve Swedish academic institutions in delegations linked to Chinese military interests, raising further alarms.
Additionally, Chen Axelsson previously worked at the Chinese newspaper People’s Daily alongside Lei Da, identified in two previous espionage cases in Sweden as an intelligence officer for the Chinese security services. Chen Axelsson maintains that she was unaware of Lei Da’s activities and refutes any claims that she poses a security threat to Sweden.
Deportation process
The deportation process under the LSU law involves Säpo submitting a request to the Swedish Migration Agency, which can be appealed to the government—the final authority. So far, the government has always supported Säpo’s original requests.
As Sweden strengthens its stance on suspected espionage, the growing number of deportations highlights crucial questions about balancing national security measures with civil liberties. The recent trend underscores the ongoing challenges of managing foreign influence and ensuring the safety of Sweden’s citizens.
Furthermore Sweden deport Chinese
Source: SVT
